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Worldview, Sphere
Sovereignty, and
Desiring the Kingdom: A

Guide for (Perplexed) Reformed Folk

by James K.A. Smith

S

omehow I never learned how to lie prostrate
before sacred cows. It’s not that I lack idolatrous
inclinations; it’s just that I regularly underestimate
the sacred nature of prevailing bovine statues in
the neighborhood. It’s not that I’m an eager iconoJames K. A. Smith is Professor of Philosophy at Calvin
College, where he also teaches in the Department of
Congregational & Ministry Studies and serves as a
Research Fellow of the Calvin Institute of Christian
Worship.

clast; it’s just that I’m enough of a newcomer to
various conversations that I don’t always appreciate
the sacrosanct status of “our” concepts.
For example, I quickly learned that if you write
a book on Christian education and offhandedly
(and somewhat tongue-in-cheek) suggest even a
temporary “moratorium” on the notion of “worldview,” you can expect some animated responses
and festering suspicion.1 The villagers begin to get
restless, so to speak, even if you thought you were a
citizen of the village. This suspicion has characterized some of the response to Desiring the Kingdom in
Reformed quarters of Christian higher education.
This essay addresses some of those concerns by
providing something of a guide to the argument of
Desiring the Kingdom for Reformed folk who might
be perplexed by some of my claims and proposals.2
In the process, I hope I can reestablish that I’m one
of “us” and even that the core of my argument is
unapologetically Reformed.
To do so, I will very briefly rehearse the argument of Desiring the Kingdom. It begins from a sort
of working axiom that every pedagogy assumes an
anthropology: that is, every approach to education
assumes some model of the human person, even
if this anthropology is never made explicit. Thus,
our understanding of the nature and goal of education is shaped by what we think human beings are.
So if you (implicitly) think that human beings are
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essentially thinking things—containers for ideas,
beliefs, and propositions—then you will end up
conceiving of education as a primarily informative project: the dissemination of ideas and beliefs
into mind-receptacles. And I argue that much of
the recent rhetoric about “worldview” in Christian
higher education falls into this camp: it tends to
think about the nature and task of Christian education as the dissemination of certain content, or the
provision of a Christian “perspective” on how to
think about the world.
The argument of Desiring the Kingdom is not that
this is wrong but only that it is inadequate, and
this inadequacy stems from the stunted anthropology that is assumed. Or, to put this in terms I first
learned from the Reformational tradition, such a
picture of education is insufficiently radical because
it doesn’t get to the root of our identity. By focusing on the cognitive and intellectual, such a model
of the person—and its corresponding picture of
education—undervalues and underestimates the
importance of the affective; by focusing on what
we think and believe, such a model misses the centrality and primacy of what we love; by focusing on
education as the dissemination of information, we
have missed the ways in which Christian education
is really a project of formation. In other words, at the
heart of Desiring the Kingdom’s argument is an antireductionism and the affirmation of a more holistic
understanding of human persons and Christian
education. And such antireductionism and holism
I learned at the feet of Herman Dooyeweerd and
Calvin Seerveld.
Thus, I make three intertwined proposals in
the book, all indebted to Saint Augustine, that patron saint of the Reformers: first, I sketch an alternative anthropology that emphasizes the primacy
of love and the priority of the imagination in shaping our identity and governing our orientation to
the world;3 second, I emphasize that education is
also about the formation (“aiming”) of our love and
desire, and that such formation happens through
embodied, communal rituals we might call “liturgies”—including a range of “secular” liturgies that
are pedagogies of desire; third, given the formative priority of liturgical practices, I argue that the
task of Christian education needs to be resituated
within the ecclesial practices of Christian worship
16
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and liturgical formation. In other words, we need
to reconnect worship and worldview, church and
college.
As I should have guessed, this nexus of proposals set off alarms for those within a Reformed
(especially Kuyperian) orbit. Let me try to formulate these as the FAQs often directed to Desiring
the Kingdom, and then extend the conversation by
trying to answer these questions here:
1.

2.

3.

Is this really Reformed? How could a
proposal that is critical of the notion of
“worldview” be Reformed? And isn’t the
“worldview” that’s being rejected here really only a caricature?
Isn’t this just a new-fangled version of old,
fundamentalist anti-intellectualism? Isn’t
this just Jamie returning to his emotivist
Pentecostal heritage? Doesn’t this model
give comfort to those who would denigrate
the life of the mind and the importance of
critical Christian reflection? Isn’t Desiring
the Kingdom just retreating to the status quo
that generated the so-called scandal of the
evangelical mind?
Aren’t we in danger of blurring important boundaries between the church and
the college? In other words, doesn’t this
proposal violate the sovereignty of the
spheres—making the school into the
church? Don’t we need some border patrol
here?

These are all very fair concerns. They get to
the heart of whether the sort of college envisioned
in Desiring the Kingdom is really “Reformed.” I’m
grateful for the opportunity to address these three
sets of concerns as a way of trying to establish
the Reformed pedigree of the “ecclesial college”
sketched at the end of Desiring the Kingdom.
I. Whose Worldview? Which Calvinism?
Does Desiring the Kingdom pull the rug out from
under the very project of Reformed higher education by rejecting the notion of worldview? A very
simple answer is, “No.” A more complex, nuanced
answer is, “Kinda maybe sorta.” Let me explain.

A. Two Cheers for Worldview
To be very clear, nowhere in Desiring the Kingdom
do I reject the notion of worldview. Indeed, if I can
offer a bit of personal testimony, the truth is that,
for me, the discovery of “worldview thinking” was
revolutionary. I’m a whole-hearted worldview convert, as it were. Having been converted to Christian
faith through a very dualistic, anti-intellectual tradition (the Plymouth Brethren—a named target in

My concern is that
just when it seems as if
everybody is adopting a
“worldview” approach,
what we get in the name
of “worldview” is a stunted
step-brother of the holistic
“complex” Abraham
Kuyper spoke of when
discussing the Calvinist
“world- and life-view.”6
Kuyper’s “Common Grace” lecture!), I found the
“world-affirming” ethos of the Reformed tradition
to be both liberating and illuminating. The holism
of this “worldview” paradigm has informed every aspect of my work; yea, it’s precisely why I answered the call to become a Christian scholar. It’s
also why, now, when I face students who have been
hearing about the Reformed “worldview” of “creation-fall-redemption” since kindergarten (having
been blessed with a lifetime of Christian education in the Reformed tradition where these matters are taken for granted), I’m not sure whether to
yell or cry when I see their jaded eyes glaze over. I
do somersaults to try to get them to (re)appreciate
the genius and wisdom embedded in “worldview”
thinking, which, in my experience, broke open the
world for me.
So I have to confess that I find it odd when

readers conclude that Desiring the Kingdom rejects the
notion of worldview. It certainly offers a critique of
where this model has gone, but it does not amount
to a “rejection” of worldview—even if I do counsel
a (temporary) “moratorium” on the term. Indeed, on
the opening page of the book (on the first page of
the Preface) I note that, though my project is to
“push down through worldview to worship as the
matrix from which a Christian worldview is born,”
“[t]his doesn’t require rejecting worldview-talk,
only situating it in relation to Christian practices”
(11).4 In fact, in the next sentence I offer Desiring
the Kingdom as a “companion volume” to classic
worldview texts such as Walsh and Middleton’s
Transforming Vision, Wolters’ Creation Regained, and
Neal Plantinga’s Engaging God’s World.5
All that is simply to emphasize that, rather than
being a “sustained attack” on worldview, Desiring
the Kingdom offers two cheers for this paradigm.
Indeed, the whole project assumes the worldview
paradigm in order to refine and recalibrate it.
B. On the Inadequacies of Worldview: Or,
Reading Wendell Berry in Costco
So where does this perception come from?
What is it about Desiring the Kingdom that makes
people worried that I’m abandoning the importance of worldview for Christian higher education?
On the one hand, I spend some time noting that
the model of “worldview” I’m rejecting is a kind of
mutated version that has emerged precisely when
worldview-talk went evangelical, so to speak, unhooked from the creation-affirming holism of the
Reformed tradition (DTK 31-32). My concern is
that just when it seems as if everybody is adopting
a “worldview” approach, what we get in the name
of “worldview” is a stunted step-brother of the holistic “complex” Abraham Kuyper spoke of when
discussing the Calvinist “world-and life-view.”6
On the other hand, I think there remain legitimate concerns with even the best rendition of
“worldview” approaches insofar as they tend to
still conceive the task of Christian education as
the dissemination of a perspective, a way to see the
world. My criticism here is not that this is wrong
but only that it is inadequate. It is an approach that
imagines us (and our students) as primarily spectators of the world rather than as actors in the world.
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But if one of the goals of Christian education is to
form what Neal Plantinga describes as “prime citizens of the kingdom,” then we need to appreciate
that we act as citizens, not primarily on the basis of
cognitive deliberation, or even on the basis of our
“perspectives,” but for the most part on the basis
of acquired habits, unconscious desires, and preintellectual dispositions. And so our education has
to be attuned to how those desires and dispositions
are formed. We might have a highly developed, articulate “worldview” and yet act in ways that are
remarkably inconsistent with such a “perspective.”
Let me try to make sense of this with an example: over the past several years, through the
steady evangelism of my wife, Deanna, I have become more and more convinced about the injustice
of our dominant systems of food production and
consumption. Through the influence of people
like Barbara Kingsolver, Michael Pollan, and especially Wendell Berry, I have become intellectually
convinced that they offer the best perspective for
thinking about these issues. Indeed, in many ways
I’ve owned their perspective as my own.
But a funny thing happened on the way to the
grocery store: I discovered a significant gap between my thought and my action. This hit home
to me one day while I was immersed in reading
Wendell Berry’s delightful anthology, Bringing It
to the Table. As I paused to reflect on a key point,
and thus briefly took my nose out of the book, I
was suddenly struck by an ugly irony: here I was
reading Wendell Berry in the food court at Costco.
There are so many things wrong with that sentence
I don’t even know where to begin: indeed, “the
food court at Costco” might be a kind of shorthand for Berry’s picture of the sixth circle of hell.
So how might one account for this gap between my thought and my action—between my
passionate intellectual assent to these ideas and my
status quo action? Well, this is exactly the intuition
at the heart of Desiring the Kingdom: While Pollan
and Berry may have successfully recruited my intellect, they have not been successful in converting
my habits. Nor could they be, for too much of my
action and orientation to the world is governed by
dispositions that are shaped by practice.
Implicit in the anthropology of Desiring the
Kingdom is a philosophy of action—a tacit assump18
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tion about what drives or causes human behavior and action, and such a philosophy of action is
germane to the goal and task of Christian education. Desiring the Kingdom’s account of the formative
power of both “secular liturgies” and intentional
Christian worship has a certain urgency precisely
because it assumes that most of our orientation
to—and action in—the world is governed by preconscious habits and patterns of behavior, and that
those habits are formed by environments of practice. This view stands in contrast to what Charles
Taylor calls “intellectualist”7 or “decisionist” models, which tend to overestimate “thinking” as the
cause of action. This view does not entail a crass
determinism; nor does it exclude a role for reflective, deliberative, conscious “choice.” However,
such a model—shored up by recent research in
cognitive science—does relativize the role of ratiocinative deliberation in action. More positively,
it highlights the significant impact of environment
(and attendant practices) in shaping our “adaptive
unconscious,” which then steers/drives action at a
preconscious level. As such, we should be increasingly attentive to the formative role of environment and practice in shaping our desires.
The response to such a situation is not simply
pressing people to think more about what they’re
doing. Consider another example from eating and
practices associated with food. In his book Mindless
Eating, Cornell nutritionist Brian Wansink accounts
for the American obesity epidemic in terms of the
habits and practices that unconsciously shape our
tastes and eating patterns.8 We are trained to orient ourselves to food and food systems by practices and environments that shape our orientation
at a preconscious level—and then we regularly act
on the basis of those malformed desires. We eat
“mindlessly.” However, what’s most significant is
Wansink’s antidote to this problem: it is not a matter of mindful eating. Drawing on extensive psychological research, Wansink demonstrates that
we simply are not the sorts of animals who can be
deliberatively “on” all the time. So the proper response to unhealthy mindless eating is not mindful
eating but rather healthy mindless eating, changing
environments and practices in order to form different (unconscious) habits.
A “worldview approach” would assume that

the proper response to mindless eating is mindful eating. Similarly, an “intellectualist” model of
education would assume that the proper response
to the unconscious formation of “secular liturgies”
would be “critical reflection,” thinking about it more,
thinking about what we’re doing. Of course, such reflection and thinking is important and crucial; and
the articulation of a Christian worldview is helpful—but as I’ve already pointed out, you can read
Wendell Berry in Costco. The argument of Desiring
the Kingdom is not that we need less than worldview,
but more: that Christian education will only be fully
an education to the extent that it is also a formation
of our habits. And such formation happens not
only, or even primarily, by equipping the intellect
but through the repetitive formation of embodied,
communal practices. And as I suggest in Desiring
the Kingdom, the “core” practices in this respect are
specifically the practices of Christian worship. But
before turning to a consideration of the role of
worship in Christian education, let me address a
second concern: that Desiring the Kingdom encourages a retreat back into anti-intellectual pietism.
II. A Hearts and Minds Strategy: On Antiintellectualism
Granted, in Desiring the Kingdom I basically argue that discussions of Christian higher education
overestimate the importance of thinking. This
is generally not a good strategy for trying to win
friends and influence people when the people involved consider themselves thinkers. Furthermore,
many of those toiling in the not-so-ivory halls of
Christian colleges and universities would be quite
surprised to hear that thinking is being overvalued
in North American Christianity. Indeed, quite the
opposite seems to be true: evangelical piety tends
to intensify a general anti-intellectual malaise that
besets our culture. The response to such a situation
would be to encourage more thinking, not less—to
emphasize the importance of the mind, not fall back
into the soppy mushiness of “the heart” and its affections. In short, with its critique of “rationalist”
or “intellectualist” models of the human person, it
would seem that Desiring the Kingdom plays right into
the hands of anti-intellectualism.9
Indeed, some seem to worry that, on my model, we’d just spend all day in chapel or that the

Christian college would just be a glorified Sunday
school. But such worries stem from a misunderstanding of my emphasis on worship with respect
to worldview;10 in particular, such a worry seems
to read my claim—that worship is a necessary and
important condition for integral Christian education—as if I were saying this was a sufficient condition for Christian education. But I’m not suggesting we raze the physics labs and expand the chapel.
I’m not suggesting we demolish the literature classroom and all just stay in church all week. Nor do I
anywhere suggest that a Christian university is not
about the business of ideas! Of course it is; the issue
is whether it is just trafficking in ideas. It’s the latter
that I’m rejecting.

The argument of Desiring
the Kingdom is not
that we need less than
worldview, but more: that
Christian education will
only be fully an education
to the extent that it is also a
formation of our habits.
However, let me honor this worry about anti-intellectualism by pointing out two things in
response: First, I will concede that, on the basis
of a hasty and selective reading, the argument
of Desiring the Kingdom could “fall into the wrong
hands,” so to speak. That is, a superficial reading
of the project might misunderstand it as giving
comfort to just the sort of anti-intellectualism that
Reformed evangelical scholars have been working
to undo. While I don’t think a close reading of the
argument bears this out, I think I understand how
this happened: quite simply, I inhabit a stream of
the Christian tradition where devotion to the life
of the mind has deep roots. And such a commitment to the “life of the mind” was so assumed in
my argument that I could criticize a certain “rationalist” overemphasis without ever worrying
Pro Rege—June 2011

19

that this would give license to abandoning critical
thinking.11
Second, let me just emphasize that my goal is
not to denigrate the intellect but to situate theoretical reflection within the wider purview of our fundamental pre-theoretical orientation to the world.12
From this goal, some too hastily conclude that
relativizing the intellectual is somehow a rejection
of the intellectual, but that clearly doesn’t follow.
Desiring the Kingdom is pressing us to consider the
significance of our non- and pre-intellectual orientation of the world, to appreciate all of the ways
in which this shapes and governs our being in the
world, and to therefore expand what we consider
as falling within the purview of education. To situate (and relativize) the intellect is not anti-intellectual; it is emphasizing that even rationality needs
to be faithful, needs to be disciplined and trained.
And this seems to be a deeply biblical sensibility.
Indeed, Paul’s prayer for the Christians in Philippi
could easily be the epigraph of Desiring the Kingdom:
And this I pray, that your love may abound still
more and more in real knowledge and all discernment, so that you may determine what really matters… (Phi. 1.9-10, NASB, revised)

Our knowledge and discernment is guided and
shaped by our loves. And love takes practice.
The fact that our loves guide and shape our
knowledge and discernment is my reason for emphasizing the implications: education operates on
this pre-theoretical register whether we recognize
it or not. Pedagogies of desire form our habits,
affections, and imaginations, thus shaping and
priming our very orientation to the world. So if
a Christian education is going to be holistic and
formative, it needs to attend to much more than
the intellect; for this reason, I emphasize that a
unique “understanding” is “carried” in Christian
practices, particularly the practices of Christian
worship. It is in such practices that our love is
“trained,” disciplined, shaped, and formed. And it
is, to some extent, only in such practices that this
training, disciplining, shaping, and forming can
happen. Attention to intellect is insufficient precisely because there is an irreducible, unique “understanding” that is only carried in practices.
Let me try to make sense of this point with
20
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an analogy between literature and liturgy, drawing
on the work of Merleau-Ponty.13 Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology provides the framework to more
carefully articulate the core claim of Desiring the
Kingdom: that love is its own kind of knowing, operative on a “pre-theoretical” register. For MerleauPonty, this knowing requires taking our embodiment
more seriously, charting a space between “intellect” and instinct, between reflection and reflex. As
he poetically puts it, “my body is the pivot of the
world.”14 What he’s describing—and what I was
trying to describe in Desiring the Kingdom—is a kind
of “preconscious knowledge” which is “not of the
kind: ‘I think that….’”15
Merleau-Ponty describes this kind of knowledge as “motor intentionality,”16 a kind of bodily
knowledge that cannot be articulated in propositional form. Our actions and movement, then,
are not “handmaidens of consciousness” as if the
outcome of deliberative representation; to the contrary, “[c]onsciousness is being-towards-the-thing
through the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it,
that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world,’
and to move one’s body is to aim at things through
it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call.”17
He names this “praktognosia”—an irreducible
know-how that gets into our bones: “Our bodily
experience of movement is not a particular case
of knowledge; it provides us with a way of access
to the world and the object, with a ‘praktognosia,’
which has to be recognized as original and perhaps
as primary.”18 Thus Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment and “motor intentionality”
provides resources to understand the mechanics of
liturgical formation, which is also bodily—another
kind of “training” or “praktognosia.”
Furthermore, his phenomenological framework can also help us understand the function of
narrative, story, and literature.19 For example, in
considering the case study of “Schneider”—whose
brain injury has eliminated his praktognosia and
requires him to think through everything—MerleauPonty notes that because of this condition,
Schneider is unable to understand stories. “[I]ndeed
if a story is told to the patient, it is observed that instead of grasping it as a melodic whole with down
and up beats, with its characteristic rhythm or flow,

he remembers it only as a succession of facts to be
noted one by one.”20 This is because there is a kind
of knowledge “carried” in stories which cannot be
processed didactically, cannot be paraphrased.21
III.Church, College, and Sphere Sovereignty:
Re-reading Kuyper
Desiring the Kingdom, then, argues that a holistic,
formative Christian education not only will equip
students with a Christian perspective but also must
form students through Christian practice—for
only practiced formation will adequately capture
our imaginations and convert our habits such that
our orientation and action in the world is aimed
at the shalom God desires for his creation.22 This
wider goal means that Christian colleges and universities must be not only informed by a Christian
worldview but also nourished by Christian worship,
for it is the historic, intentional, communal practices of Christian worship that “carry” a formative,
liturgical “understanding” of God’s redemptive
good news.23 And this “know-how”—this praktognosia—cannot be paraphrased; it cannot be
adequately translated into the portability of propositions. It can only be absorbed through practice.

Through the practices of
Christian worship, we
acquire a tacit know-how
that shapes our action,
including our theoretical
activity.
On this account, Christian worship (and other
related Christian practices24) is not just beneficial
to the task of Christian education but essential.
Through the practices of Christian worship, we acquire a tacit know-how that shapes our action, including our theoretical activity. These practices are
meant to form us as a people who desire the kingdom and who embody a foretaste of that coming
kingdom. But before we ever articulate a Christian
worldview, we absorb a visceral understanding of

God’s kingdom in the practice of Christian worship. If we believe in order to understand, you
might say we worship in order to worldview.
It is this part of my argument that raises the
final cluster of concerns for Reformed folk: doesn’t
this sound as if I’m collapsing the church as “organism” into the church as “institute?” Doesn’t
this blur the boundaries between church and
school, between these sovereign spheres? This all
starts to sound a bit, well, “Catholic.”
Let me address this concern from a couple of
angles.
First, I’ll confess that I am quite intentionally
countering a certain kind of Kuyperianism; but
that might not be the same as countering Kuyper.
Kuyper has been inherited in different ways in
North America, yielding different Kuyperianisms.
While Zwaanstra suggests that “ecclesiology was
the core of [Kuyper’s] theology,”25 one quickly
notes that it is the church as organism that is the
“heart” of his doctrine. This emphasis, coupled
with some other emphases in Kuyper, led to a
strain of Kuyperianism that actually had little
place for the church as institute in its understanding of Christian engagement with culture. Indeed,
there have even been strains of Kuyperianism that
have been quite anti-ecclesial. On the other hand,
Kuyper himself clearly saw a crucial role for the
church as institute and devoted a great deal of his
time, energy, and gifts to its welfare and reform.26
The fact that he did, signals that there might be a
different way to inherit Kuyper on this score. This
idea invites us to re-read Kuyper with new eyes,
and I’d like to briefly offer such a re-reading here.
Let’s take, as an example, his classic statement
of sphere sovereignty and the institute/organism
distinction in “Common Grace.”27 In order to get
to the heart of the matter, permit me a brief detour
into his argument. We should first appreciate that
he’s doing battle on two fronts: on the one hand,
he is opposing the model of a “national church”
(which was then still a sort of live option in the
Netherlands); on the other hand, he is battling “sectarianism,” which is the ecclesiological outworking
of the pietism he has already criticized. Let’s pick
this up in his critique of the national church.
Note, first, where Kuyper says that he agrees
with the national church “party”: “[W]e and they
Pro Rege—June 2011
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agree that Christ’s church and its means of grace
cover a broader field than that of special grace
alone” (189). In other words, they both agree that
the church— as the body of Christ—is called to
have an impact beyond merely “spiritual” matters.
The body of Christ is to be the agent by which the
“significance” of Christ for “nature” is made manifest. “We both acknowledge that the church does
two things: (1) it works directly for the well-being
of the elect, lures them to conversion, comforts,
edifies, unites, and sanctifies them; but (2) it works
indirectly for the well-being of the whole of civil society, constraining it to civic virtue” (189-190). So
the church is called to have a “leavening” effect
on society, impacting all the spheres of human cultural production.
With that agreement in mind, we can appreciate the difference; viz., they differ “in how to reach
that good goal.” The disagreement, in other words,
is about strategy. The national church party thinks
that the way to have this impact is to “include civil
society in the church” (190). Kuyper, in contrast,
emphasizes that the church as institute should be a
“city on a hill amid civil society” (190) from which
the church as organism infiltrates and leavens civil
society. As he’ll later put it, “[t]his institute does
not cover everything that is Christian. Though the
lamp of the Christian religion only burns within
that institute’s walls, its light shines out through
its windows to areas far beyond, illumining all
the sectors and associations that appear across the
wide range of human life and activity” (194). Thus,
he suggests that we picture these as concentric circles, with the church as institute—administering
the sacraments, exercising discipline, forming disciples—nourishing a vibrant core of believers who,
as an organism, infiltrate and leaven civil society
(194-195).28
With this model in mind, we can see Kuyper’s
critique of both the national church and sectarianism. Because the national church model “recognizes only one circle,”29 so to speak (194)—because
it can only imagine the church as institute and thus
absorbs civil society into the institute—it thereby
dilutes the vibrant core that is needed to be leavening. In other words, by baptizing everyone, the
national church admits into the church a host of
non-confessors and unbelievers, and by failing to
22
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exercise church discipline, it loses any purifying or
sanctifying animus with which to impact society.
By effectively taking “the world” (i.e., civil society, 194) into the church, the church just becomes
worldly (196). It lacks any Christ-disciplined center
from which to be a means of making Christ “significant” for the rest of society.30
However, if the national church goes wrong by
losing its center so to speak, sectarianism goes wrong
by retreating into and fortifying itself within a pure
“center” and thereby neglecting responsibility for
“nature.” “Sects,” for Kuyper, are those configurations (or rather, disfigurations) of Christianity that
effectively put themselves “outside the context of
human life” (191). A sect is “a tiny holy circle that has
remained on earth by mistake and really has nothing to do with the life that is lived down here” (191).
Sectarians are also critics of the national church,
but they criticize not only the strateg y but also the
goal; on their account, the Gospel is not concerned
with the institutions and practices of civil society.
Politics, economics, the arts, and education are
“worldly” matters not of their concern. In short,
sectarianism rejects what God affirms as good,
viz., creation in all its facets; thus, it also rejects any
notion of common grace.31 Or, in the language
Kuyper has used earlier, sectarians reject “nature.”
Now, what does this distinction between the
church as institute and organism have to do with
our concern—specifically, the relationship between the church and college, worship and worldview? Well, what’s at stake here is not only how we
make the distinction between the two, but how we
understand the relation between the two. So while
Kuyper certainly emphasizes that “the institute
does not cover everything that is Christian” (194),
he goes on to note, recalling the concentric circle
metaphor, that “Aside from this first circle of the
institute and in necessary connection with it, we thus recognize another circle whose circumference is determined by the length of the ray that shines out
from the church institute over the life of people
and nation” (195, emphases added). It seems to me
that it is precisely Kuyper’s claim that there is a necessary connection between institute and organism that
has been lost in certain strains of Kuyperianism.
And why does Kuyper propose a necessary connection between the two? He does so precisely be-

cause it is the worship of the church as institute
which forms those who will be the rays of light in
civil society.
The model I propose in Desiring the Kingdom
does not collapse the distinction between institute
and organism, but it does aim to (re)connect them
in just the “necessary” way Kuyper emphasized.
Conclusion: Remember We Are Catholic
That said, the question isn’t whether my argument is Kuyperian. My goal has been to demonstrate that it is Reformed. However, in demonstrating that it is Reformed, I don’t mean to argue
that it is not “Catholic.” That is a charge I will happily, even eagerly, accept, for I think Reformed
folk could do nothing better than remember we
are Catholic.32 The Protestant Reformation is an
Augustinian renewal movement in the church
catholic, not a philosophical project spawned in
the early twentieth century. The unique educational vision of the Reformed tradition will only
be enhanced and deepened through a more intentional appropriation of the accrued wisdom of our
Catholic heritage—a wisdom that is “carried,” first
and foremost, in the shape of Christian worship.
If we hope to “worldview” well, we must learn to
worship well.

7. On such accounts, our action is thought to be the
outcome of conscious, mental deliberation—the
outcome of thinking about it.
8. Brian Wansink, Mindless Eating: Why We Eat More Than
We Think (New York: Bantam, 2007).
9. In this context, it’s odd to be charged with some kind
of anti-intellectualism, not only because I explicitly
reject this on the first page of the book (17, n.2), but
also because the book itself is not exactly a walk in
the park. The entire argument of the book is a pretty
rigorous engagement with a whole host of ideas,
inviting the reader to think through complex theories
from the likes of Heidegger, Augustine, Taylor, and
Bourdieu, all in order to articulate a unique, integral
Christian “perspective” on education. If this reading
of Desiring the Kingdom were correct, you’d wonder why
I’d ever spend time on such a venture. Perhaps that’s a
clue that this is not the best way to read the book.
10. I grant that I’m making strong claims about
primacy that might almost give the impression of
a dichotomous relationship between worship and
worldview; but I don’t think I ever actually make the
relation dichotomous, precisely for reasons I’ve already
cited.
11. As I note in the preface, I imagined Desiring the Kingdom
as a companion volume to books like Cornelius
Plantinga’s Engaging God’s World, which clearly
articulates the importance for Christian academic
reflection on God’s world.

Endnotes

12. In this respect, my argument is very much indebted
to Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacInytre’s Dependent,
Rational Animals.

1. See James K.A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship,
Worldview, and Cultural Formation (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2009), 65.

13. Working out some of what follows will be a central
focus of How Worship Works, the sequel to Desiring the
Kingdom.

2. This paper originated as a plenary presentation at
the 2010 Symposium of the Association of Reformed
Institutions of Higher Education at Redeemer
University College. I’m grateful to Syd Hielema of
Redeemer for the invitation to give this address and to
the participants in the conference for their feedback.

14. “The body is a vehicle of being in the world, and having
a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a
definite environment, to identify oneself with certain
projects and be continually committed to them.”
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenolog y of Perception,
trans. Colin Smith (London: Routlege, 2002), 94.

3.

15. Ibid., 93, 94. Merleau-Ponty invokes a moving example:
“We do not understand the absence or death of a friend
until the time comes when we expect a reply from him
and when we realize that we shall never again receive
one” ( 93). This sort of “understanding” is often most
powerfully expressed in literature or art (consider, in
this case, Patty Griffin’s song, “Goodbye”).

In volume 2 of the Cultural Liturgies trilogy (tentatively
titled How Worship Works: Imagining Liturg y as Literature)
I will discuss this in terms of a “philosophy of action.”

4. I make the same point a few pages into the Introduction
when I note that “I don’t want to entirely abandon”
worldview-talk (24).
5.

I also explicitly affirm the helpfulness of “worldview”
in my new book, Letters to a Young Calvinist: An Invitation
to the Reformed Tradition (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010).

6. For my positive articulation of this project, see ibid,
106-124.

16. Ibid., 158-159.
17. Ibid., 159-161.
18. Ibid., 162. It’s important to note that Merleau-Ponty
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significantly influenced Charles Taylor, who played a
central role in the argument of Desiring the Kingdom.

26. Abraham Kuyper, Our Worship, ed. Harry Boonstra
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009).

19. Indeed, this is a central analogy for Merleau-Ponty
when he addressed the irreducibility of praktognosia,
resisting the twin reductionisms of intellectualism
and empiricism, citing Scheler: “Just as all literary
works…are only particular cases of the possible
permutations of the sounds which make up language
and of their literal signs, so qualities or sensations
represent the elements from which the great poetry
of our world (Umwelt) is made up. But just as surely
as someone knowing only sounds and letters would
have no understanding of literature, and would miss
not only its ultimate nature but everything about it, so
the world is not given and things are not accessible to
those for whom ‘sensations’ are the given” (Ibid., 374).

27. Abraham Kuyper, “Church and Culture,” from
Common Grace in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader,
ed. J. Bratt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 187-201.

20. Ibid., 153.
21. This raises crucial questions about form that will

be addressed in detail by drawing an analogy
between the irreducibility of form in poetry and
liturgy (addressed under the rubric of “the heresy
of paraphrase”; see Phenomenolog y of Perception, 174175).

22. I should perhaps explicitly clarify that I don’t think
only educational institutions will do this. In a way, I am
suggesting that all Christian institutions will only be
holistically Christian to the extent that they are both
informed by a Christian worldview and formed by
Christian practices.
23. See Desiring the Kingdom, chapter 5.
24. See, for example, Dorothy Bass & Craig Dykstra, eds.,
Practicing Our Faith: A Way of Life for a Searching People, 2nd
ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010). For discussion
of how Christian practices relate to Christian Teaching,
see David I. Smith & James K.A. Smith, “Introduction”
to Teaching and Christian Practices: Reshaping Faith and
Learning (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011).
25. Henry Zwaanstra, “Abraham Kuyper’s Conception of
the Church,” Calvin Theological Journal 9 (1974): 149-181
at p.150.
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28. Kuyper, in a mode of Protestant flourish, actually
claims that the church as organism precedes the church
as institute—and could even “manifest itself” where
the church as institute has ceased to function (195).
29. This seems to be why Kuyperians construe “Catholic”
models (of, say, Cavanaugh or MacIntyre) as variations
on this “national church” model. But the national
church model seems uniquely Protestant (not to say
that obviously there are older Catholic correlates of
this). This needs discussion and refinement. See Bolt
on MacIntyre.
30. Kuyper also generates a theological account for a
principled pluralism in this context: “what we want
is a strong confessional church but not a confessional
civil society nor a confessional state” (197). Thus, he
advocates a certain kind of “secularization of state
and society”—one that makes space for confessional
pluralism in the state and civil society—as “one of the
most basic ideas of Calvinism” (197). (This should
be distinguished from an aggressive secularism that
would seek to “nullify the church’s influence on civil
society” [196].)
31. Kuyper’s argument is a tad circular here: he chastises
the sectarians for refusing to recognize common
grace and therefore refusing to affirm the goodness of
civil society (192). We also need to (later) distinguish
pietistic sectarianism from antithetical critique.
32. In some ways, Kuyper was more Protestant than the
Reformers! Consider his critique of Calvin as being
“too Catholic” (153). One could say that Kuyper
over-emphasizes the role of worship as “expression”
and misses the aspect of “formation.” As a result, he
tends to see the church as a voluntary gathering of
individual believers rather than an institutional site of
the sacraments and means of grace (153-154). In short,
one finds quite a modern individualism in Kuyper.

